Transnational Corporations & International Human Rights Disputes: Alternatives to Litigation by Silva, Jacquelyn
Santa Clara Law Review 
Volume 61 Number 3 Article 5 
9-1-2021 
Transnational Corporations & International Human Rights 
Disputes: Alternatives to Litigation 
Silva, Jacquelyn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Silva, Jacquelyn, Case Note, Transnational Corporations & International Human Rights Disputes: 
Alternatives to Litigation, 61 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol61/iss3/5 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital 




TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS & 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTES:  




Individuals working for transnational corporations face immense 
challenges in securing their fundamental rights and receiving remedy 
for corporate abuses.  Inversely, transnational corporations face various 
risks against their social responsibility when they prioritize their 
operations and profits.  Current international law efforts have been 
assessing ways in which to impose human rights obligations on 
companies more directly.  Any such imposition of human rights 
protections advances the necessity of considering the mechanisms 
available to resolve such disputes, especially given that litigation in 
international “courts” is not available for this purpose.  Until an 
international forum is established, challenges remain in confronting 
human rights disputes against transnational corporations, including 
jurisdictional constraints and methods of enforcement.  This Article will 
assess the existing landscape of dispute resolution and enforcement as 
concerning transnational entities and will highlight arbitration and 
mediation as alternate approaches for achieving structured respect and 









 * Research Editor, SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW, Volume 61. J.D., Santa Clara 
University School of Law, 2021; B.A., Political Science, University of California, Davis. I 
would like to thank Professor David L. Sloss for inspiring my research on this topic and for 
his mentorship throughout this endeavor. I would also like to thank the SANTA CLARA LAW 
REVIEW for this opportunity and for their hard work throughout the publication process. 
Lastly, a very special thanks to my family and friends who have encouraged and supported 
me throughout law school. 
 
868 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 I. Introduction ............................................................................. 869 
 II. Historical Overview: The Development of International  
  Human Rights Law and its Applicability to Transnational 
Corporations ............................................................................ 871 
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ................... 871 
B. The UN Global Compact ................................................. 873 
C. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human  
 Rights ............................................................................... 874 
D. Proposed Binding Treaty on Business and Human  
 Rights ............................................................................... 877 
 III. A Legal Overview: The Legal Constraints of Corporate 
Accountability and Transnational Enforcement  
  Mechanisms ............................................................................. 878 
A. Domestic Litigation: International Human Rights  
 Claims Against Corporations in U.S. Courts ................... 880 
1. General Jurisdiction in U.S. State Courts .................. 882 
2. Specific Jurisdiction in U.S. State Courts .................. 882 
B. International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ................ 883 
 IV. The Avenues of Alternative Dispute Resolution: How  
  ADR Mechanisms can be Used to Hold Transnational 
Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Violations ....... 885 
A. Arbitration ........................................................................ 886 
1. ICC International Court of Arbitration ...................... 888 
2. The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights 
Arbitration .................................................................. 890 
3. Investor State Arbitration ........................................... 892 
B. Mediation ......................................................................... 894 
 V. Why Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms May  
  Best Serve International Human Rights Claimants ................. 895 
 VI. Standardizing Alternative Dispute Resolution for  
  Cases of International Human Rights Law ............................. 897 






2021] INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTES 869 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every person is fundamentally entitled to basic human rights.1  
Under international human rights law, codified in state constitutions and 
international treaties,2 states are obligated to protect individuals from 
having these rights infringed upon.  However, there exists a lack of 
enforcement at the corporate level for adherence in abiding by these 
protections.  These gaps, as they pertain to corporate social 
responsibility, remain a central focus of international human rights 
activism.  While many international organizations are dedicated to 
promoting and upholding human rights,3 legal challenges remain in 
achieving justice and redress for violations committed by transnational 
corporations.  Despite being considered ‘legal persons,’4 corporations 
pose problems for parties seeking to litigate, including jurisdictional 
constraints and the absence of binding authority.  In this regard, 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms may prove more 
accessible and responsive to human rights victims bringing claims 
against such entities. 
While participation in the international market presents appealing 
opportunities for corporate expansion, such transnational development 
implicates both social and legal risks and calls for an increased 
understanding of different environments, cultures, and trade practices.  
Accordingly, human rights obligations in the business sector have 
increasingly gained attention by international law efforts. 5  Leading 
companies are working to better understand integration abroad in order 
to account for coordination problems and address their systemic 
 
 1. What are human rights?, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) 
(“These universal rights are inherent to us all, regardless of nationality, sex, national or ethnic 
origin, color, religion, language, or any other status.”). 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS (1791); see also The Core International Human 
Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/coreinstruments.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 3. See Human Rights Organizations, GEO. L. LIBR. (2020), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/human-rights-institute/human-rights-on-
campus/internships-and-career-planning/human-rights-organizations/. 
 4. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also José E. 
Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 
9-16 (2011) (stating that the international investment regime has reasoned that corporations 
and other investors are international legal persons or subjects of international law). 
 5. See generally Protect Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/our-
work/protect-human-rights (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); Corporations, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/corporate-accountability/ (last visited Apr. 19, 
2021). 
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impacts.6  Therefore, it is essential for transnational corporations to 
closely consider the local laws and policies of their foreign subsidiaries 
and to make strong contracting decisions in anticipation of disputes.7  At 
the same time, corporations, too, find themselves benefiting from ADR 
alternatives. 
Current globalization trends reveal that roughly “one fourth of total 
global production is exported.”8  Such trade patterns naturally impose 
stress on corporate decision making, an impact that strains the attention 
of corporate efforts to consistently meet demand shifts for maximum 
profit gain.9  Accordingly, foreign investments arising out of the Global 
North are known to target opportunities in the Global South,10 based on 
the latter having a weak rule of law and operating below international 
standards.11  In such an environment, a great deal of human rights 
violations are underreported or overlooked, presenting a system that 
Northern investors can exploit, and in turn, avoid the costs of socially 
responsible operations.12 
Currently, only non-binding standards outline the values and 
procedures for businesses to follow, including requirements to abide by 
international law and respect human rights.13  In the absence of binding 
legal authority, as well as the complexities involved in litigating 
international human rights claims, it is essential to consider how ADR 
 
 6. Julie Davoren, Transnational Organization Structure, HOUS. CHRON., 
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/transnational-organization-structure-60691.html (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2021) (emphasizing the importance of business structure and coordination in global 
integration and local responsiveness). 
 7. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct 
to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389 (2005); see also DETLEV F. VAGTS ET 
AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 127 (6th ed. 2019) (“[Transnational 
corporations] enjoy a greater flexibility in organization. They may organize their managerial 
structure . . . to achieve the proper balance of global efficiency and local sensitivity.”). 
 8. See Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Diana Beltekian, Trade and Globalization, OUR WORLD 
DATA (2014), https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Lucia Gómez, Ronald Wall & Päivi Oinas, Foreign Investments in the Peripheral 
Global South, in THE STATE OF AFRICAN CITIES 2018: THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICAN 
INVESTMENT 320 (2018); see also Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. 
Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1142 
(stating that corporations operating in less developed regions are known for “pursuing profit 
at the expense of the weakest individuals”). 
 11. Rule of Law and Development, UNITED NATIONS & RULE L., 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-development/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
 12. Corporations, supra note 5 (“Companies are taking advantage of weak regulatory 
systems, especially in developing countries, and it is often the poorest people who are most at 
risk of exploitation.”). 
 13. See generally UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
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mechanisms like arbitration and mediation may remedy gaps in 
corporate accountability and succeed in correcting corporate human 
rights abuses. 14  Part II begins by outlining the historical developments 
of international human rights law and its applicability to transnational 
corporations.  Part III addresses the legal problems associated with 
international corporate accountability.  Finally, Part IV considers the use 
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, like arbitration and 
mediation, and addresses how they may be considered in the context of 
enforcing human rights in international business practices. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 
The development of human rights policies over time reveals the 
increasing significance of this area and mounting support on behalf of 
international actors.  Beginning with the development of the United 
Nations (UN), and fast-forward to current international treaties, the 
human rights regime has continued its momentum of international 
human rights enforcement.  Through this evolvement, international law 
has maneuvered the imposition of human rights obligations on the 
business sector.  While the corporate structure has long been perceived 
as having evaded such social responsibilities, current efforts have 
worked to close the gaps to allow means for holding transnational 
corporations accountable. 
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Following the catastrophic world events of the Holocaust and 
World War II, the UN was developed in 1945 to foster international 
peace and prevent future conflicts.15  These tragic events revealed the 
human catastrophes resulting from nonintervention and urged the 
creation of a collaborative international body to promote and protect 
human rights.16  The UN, operating under the UN Charter, has since 
aimed to safeguard global fundamental human rights “for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”17—encompassing 
 
 14. See Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why It 
Doesn’t Work and Why It Does, HARV. BUS. REV. (1994), https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternative-
dispute-resolution-why-it-doesnt-work-and-why-it-does. 
 15. What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L UK (Oct. 21, 
2017, 12:44 AM), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/universal-declaration-human-rights-UDHR. 
 16. Protect Human Rights, supra note 5 (citing to the UN Charter, “[m]aking the 
promotion and protection of human rights a key purpose and guiding principle of the 
Organization.”). 
 17. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 214 (2nd ed. 2009). 
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“every individual and every organ of society.”18  Through this 
mechanism, human rights became a collective concern of the 
international community.19  Today, 193 sovereign states are official 
members of the UN, with the latest member, South Sudan, being 
admitted in July 2011.20  Only two non-member states remain, although 
both have received standing invitations to participate as observers.21 
In December 1948, three years after the UN was established, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was proclaimed by the 
General Assembly.22  The UDHR officially recognized and delineated 
thirty “fundamental human rights [and freedoms] to be universally 
protected” by all UN member states.23  Since its publication, the UDHR 
has inspired the creation of over eighty human rights instruments and 
continues to “form the basis for all international human rights law.”24 
In 1966, two international human rights treaties, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)25 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),26 were 
created to implement the codified rights of the UDHR as binding on all 
ratifying states.27  Together, these three documents make up what is 
 
 18. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of 
Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 25 (1999)). 
 19. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 215. 
 20. Growth in the United Nations Membership, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); see 
also South Sudan, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states/south-
sudan (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (“The Republic of South Sudan formally seceded from 
Sudan on 9 July 2011 as a result of an internationally monitored referendum held in January 
2011, and was admitted as a new Member State by the United Nations General Assembly on 
14 July 2011.”). 
 21. Non-member States, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/non-
member-states (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (“Non-member States, [State of Palestine and Holy 
See], having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the 
work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent observer missions at 
Headquarters.”). 
 22. G.A. Res. 217 A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), 
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22; What is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15. 
 25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 26. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 
I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 27. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, FACT 
SHEET NO. 2 (REV.1), THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 
2021). 
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known as the International Bill of Human Rights.28  The United States 
became a signatory of both binding instruments in 1977, but has only 
ratified the ICCPR.29  In total, twenty-six sovereign nations have not yet 
ratified the ICESCR, and twenty-four have not yet ratified the ICCPR;30 
this reveals the enduring gaps in the incorporation of binding human 
rights laws for which such claims can be brought.31 
Moreover, existing human rights treaties do not generally impose 
legal obligations on states to regulate business entities.32  Without the 
full implementation of the International Bill of Human Rights, along 
with the general problems associated with upholding international laws 
in national jurisprudence, great barriers remain for litigating human 
rights claims against corporate actors.  Still, these instruments barely 
scrape the surface when addressing the problems associated with 
corporate liability in international law for human rights.33 
B. The UN Global Compact 
The complexities involved in the growth of the corporate sector 
have continued to create newfound economic pressures and demands, 
encouraging the evasion of social responsibility.  The 1990s marked a 
significant period of technological growth and connectivity, the effects 
of which led to the anti-globalization movement.34  In response, the UN 
Global Compact was organized and implemented in July 2000 to address 
the widespread concerns on the negative impacts of corporate business 
practices on human rights and the environment.35 
 
 28. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 215; see generally UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. 
OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/compilation1.1en.pdf. 
 29. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. 
HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.ungpreporting.org/resources/the-ungps/ [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
 33. Globalisation and Human Rights, INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS., 
https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/globalisation-human-rights/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 34. See Christian Fuchs, Antiglobalization, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/antiglobalization (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (“[The 
Antiglobalization Movement was a] social movement that emerged at the turn of the 21st 
century against . . . a model of globalization based on the promotion of unfettered markets and 
free trade.”). 
 35. Rorden Wilkinson, Global Compact, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-Compact (last updated May 17, 2016). 
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The Compact aims to encourage good business practices through 
corporate commitments to support UN goals.36  Through its voluntary 
framework, the Compact relies on CEO pledges to implement universal 
sustainability principles and general member adherence to ten non-
binding principles of business.37  These principles are derived from 
major international instruments, including the UDHR.38  Due to the 
Compact’s voluntary nature, enforcement of the business principles 
“relies on public accountability, transparency, and enlightened self-
interest.”39 
The Compact has attracted the participation of over 13,000 entities 
pledging a commitment to protecting human rights and social 
sustainability.40  However, many transnational corporations are 
suspected of participating in the Compact only to provide reputational 
protections for conducting business in places having a weak rule of 
law.41  Such unregulated environments are associated with having high 
levels of poverty and inequality and are, therefore, more likely to allow 
human rights abuses.42  Thus, participation in the Compact may give the 
impression that an entity is committed to good business practices, 
although this commitment is without enforcement. 
C. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
In 2005, the UN Secretary General appointed John G. Ruggie to 
serve as the Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.43  
Ruggie, a Harvard professor specializing in human rights and 
international affairs, had previously assisted the Secretary General in 
establishing and overseeing the UN Global Compact.44  Ruggie’s 
appointment included a fact-finding mandate to identify and clarify the 
standards of corporate responsibility with regard to human rights in order 
 
 36. About the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Wilkinson, supra note 35. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Our Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 41. Will Kenton, United Nations Global Compact, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/un-global-compact.asp (last updated Apr. 20, 2020). 
 42. See Rule of Law and Development, supra note 11. 
 43. John Ruggie, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/john-
ruggie (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); see also Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General 
Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights, 
Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Press Release SG/A/934 (July 
28, 2005), https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sga934.doc.htm [hereinafter Secretary-General 
Appoints John Ruggie]. 
 44. Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie, supra note 43. 
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to “strengthen the human rights performance of the business sector 
around the world.”45  In March 2011, after six years of conducting 
extensive research and consultations, Ruggie issued the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).46 
Ruggie described the UNGPs as the “end of the beginning,” 
intending the instrument to serve as an initial guide, giving future 
business and human rights efforts something to build off of.47  The 
UNGPs ultimately “provide an authoritative global standard for 
preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights 
linked to business activity.”48  Only one month after being published, the 
UN Human Rights Counsel unanimously endorsed the UNGPs.49  This 
was significant in endorsing business adherence to the principles by all 
entities operating within the territory or jurisdiction of UN member 
states.50 
The UNGPs are premised on a non-binding, three-pillar 
framework: protect, respect and remedy.51  The first pillar pertains to the 
state’s “duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, 
including businesses[;]” the second calls on “corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights[;]” and the third validates “greater access by 
victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.”52  This 
three-part model is “grounded in social expectations and thus not based 
on or meant to create new legal norms.”53  Notably, the UN High 
 
 45. John G. Ruggie: Berthold Beitz Research Professor in Human Rights and 
International Affairs, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. CARR CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. POL’Y, 
https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/people/john-ruggie (last visited May 2, 2021). 
 46. Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie, supra note 43. 
 47. Shane Darcy, Key Issues in the Debate on a Binding Business and Human Rights 
Instrument, BUS. & HUM. RTS. IR. (Apr. 13, 2015), 
https://businesshumanrightsireland.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/key-issues-in-the-debate-on-
a-binding-business-and-human-rights-instrument/. 
 48. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, THE UN 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RELATIONSHIP TO UN GLOBAL 
COMPACT COMMITMENTS (2014), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-
news/pdf-the-un-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights-relationship-to-un-
global-compact-commitments/. 
 49. THE UN WORKING GROUP ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UN GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 2, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/Intro_Guiding_PrinciplesBusinessHR.pd
f (last visited May 10, 2021). 
 50. See id. 
 51. UN “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, BUS. & 
HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-
generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-
framework-and-guiding-principles (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 52. Id. 
 53. BUSINESS, PEACEBUILDING AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 29 (Jason Miklian, 
Rina M. Alluri & John E. Katsos eds., 2019). 
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Commissioner promoted the UNGPs as a “ ‘ global authoritative 
standard, providing a blueprint for the steps all states and businesses 
should take to uphold human rights.’ ” 54 
Ruggie recognized the international treaty making process to be 
slow and faced with “monumental challenges.”55  The extensive process 
required in finalizing a binding instrument, coupled with the timeline for 
getting enough ratifying states for it to become enforceable, would have 
allowed for several corporate human rights violations to occur 
unaffected by a lack of international standards.56  This concern motivated 
the issuance of a non-binding instrument to avoid prolonging the 
publication of international business standards, which he considered 
essential to the human rights landscape.57  In this way, the UNGPs were 
introduced to serve as a guideline for incorporation by both business and 
state practices. 
Ultimately, the UNGPs are commitment free, meaning any efforts 
to incorporate them into business practices are legally unenforceable.58  
Without binding authority, victims of human rights abuses have limited 
means of achieving legal recourse, and businesses are not being held 
accountable.59  Additionally, national courts have shied away from 
hearing international human rights claims involving foreign parties and 
corporations.60  Having recognized this downfall, in June 2014, the UN 
Human Rights Council voted by a majority to begin developing a 
binding instrument inspired by the UNGPs to establish corporate 
liability and correct human rights violations by business entities.61 
 
 54. John Gerard Ruggie, The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business & Human Rights (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working Paper 
No. 67, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/social-construction-un-guiding-
principles-business-human-rights. 
 55. Darcy, supra note 47.   
 56. See id. 
 57. Id.   
 58. See Binding Treaty, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/big-issues/binding-treaty/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 
2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-02-05/long-arm-
international-law. 
 61. John Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN Business and Human 
Rights Treaty, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & BUS. (July 8, 2014), https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-
on-business-human-rights/the-past-as-prologue-a-moment-of-truth-for-un-business-and-
human-rights-tre/?; see also Nadia Bernaz, Opinion, The Draft UN Treaty on Business and 
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D. Proposed Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights 
Since the anti-globalization movement of the 1990s, government 
failures to prevent human rights atrocities have flooded news headlines, 
and called on the attention from the international community to close 
these gaps.62  In 2013, business and human rights issues returned to the 
UN agenda after the Human Rights Council expressed “the necessity of 
moving forward toward a legally binding framework to regulate the 
work of transnational corporations and to provide appropriate protection, 
justice and remedy to the victims of human rights abuses.”63  In June 
2014, a UN Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) was formed to 
begin developing a binding instrument modeled after the UNGPs.64 
In July 2018, the IGWG released the first draft of the Treaty on 
Business and Human Rights, termed the “Zero Draft.”65  This was the 
first international effort to create an “overarching international legal 
framework . . . governing business conduct in relation to human 
rights.”66  However, this treaty draft was problematic because it focused 
solely on businesses of “transnational character.”67  This led to legal 
uncertainty and provided businesses with the capacity to exploit and 
avoid liability through reclassification.68  By October 2018, ninety-four 
states and four hundred civil society organizations participated in the 
fourth session of the IGWG—displaying an increase of interest and 
support for the Treaty’s development.69  Treaty negotiations remain 
ongoing, with its latest revision having been published in August 2020, 
and the sixth session of the IGWG held in October 2020.70  Of course, 
future negotiations will be essential to human rights by ensuring access 
to justice and remedies for populations affected by transnational 
corporate actors. 
 
 62. See generally Adam Warden, A Brief History of the Anti-Globalization Movement, 
12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237 (2004), 
https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1082&context=umiclr. 
 63. Olga F. Sixto, Business and Human Rights: A Study on the Implications of the 
Proposed Binding Treaty 3 (Oct. 2015) (unpublished LLM manuscript) (on file with author). 
 64. Ruggie, supra note 61. 
 65. Binding Treaty, supra note 58. 
 66. Ruggie, supra note 61. 
 67. See John G. Ruggie, Opinion, Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty on Business & 
Human Rights, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/blog/comments-on-the-zero-draft-treaty-on-business-human-rights/ 
[hereinafter Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty]. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Antonella Angelini, The Way Ahead for a UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights, 
FAIR OBSERVER (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/un-treaty-
business-human-rights-brumadino-dam-collapse-news-15215/. 
 70. Binding Treaty, supra note 58. 
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The intended purpose of the Treaty will be to close the 
accountability gaps for human rights violations committed by business 
entities,71 while also imposing legally binding obligations on states to 
provide victims with a remedy for violations of their rights.72  The Treaty 
rules are intended to be enforced through domestic state efforts and to 
further promote the strengthening of international cooperation in the 
domains of business and human rights.73  Although enforcement 
mechanisms remain problematic for international treaties, developing 
hard law accountability in this area is a step in the right direction. 
III. A LEGAL OVERVIEW: THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS OF CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS 
Despite the work of the UN and the existence of various human 
rights instruments, 74 international treaties do not yet impose direct legal 
obligations on business entities, thus leaving this area of enforcement 
largely to the states.75  While ratifying governments are expected to 
implement international human rights law into their domestic systems, 
there remain obstacles in domestic enforcement of such claims.76  The 
treaty ratification process requires national governments to “put into 
place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty 
obligations.”77  However, within the implementation process, the 
strength of international treaties are not conveyed in national courts.  In 
many states, difficulties remain regarding the general recognition of all 
fundamental human rights as well as their legal enforcement.78 
For instance, federal courts in the U.S. began to avoid hearing such 
cases, which are perceived to implicate separation-of-powers and 
 
 71. See OEIGWG CHAIRMANSHIP REVISED DRAFT 16.7.2019, at art. 2, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_Revise
dDraft_LBI.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies, 
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2021). 
 75. Guiding Principles, supra note 32. 
 76. Id. 
 77. International Human Rights Law, DIAKONIA INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. CTR., 
https://www.diakonia.se/en/IHL/The-Law/International-Law1/International-Human-Rights-
Law/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
 78. See Rosa Freedman, The Lack of Basic Human Rights Around the World: A 
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foreign policy concerns.79  In 1980, Filartiga80 emerged as a landmark 
case for human rights litigation in the U.S.81  This decision established 
that victims of human rights abuses, including those committed abroad, 
could use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)82 to sue perpetrators in U.S. 
courts.83  To pursue this course of action, plaintiffs would first need to 
meet the strict burden of establishing jurisdiction over the defendant.84  
Here, the Filartiga Court determined that “a state . . . has a legitimate 
interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among those within its 
borders.”85  Despite this effort to provide a national forum for foreign 
litigants, the U.S. received political backlash from nations reinforcing 
their boundaries of nonintervention.86  In response, U.S. federal courts 
began avoiding ATS claims and eventually restricting the legal reach of 
the statute altogether.87  The U.S. poses as a great example of the 
difficulties in cross-border litigation, even without taking into account 
the additional challenge posed in hailing a corporate entity into court. 
In considering work arounds to this issue, U.S. state courts and 
international mechanisms remain seen as viable forums for human rights 
cases.  If able to navigate the substantive and jurisdictional constraints,88 
private parties may be able to bring their human rights claims under state 
law in domestic U.S. courts.  Under proper circumstances, this process 
does not require corporate consent to initiate,89 since a court having 
jurisdiction may, in theory, hail the defendant into court.  Thus, the 
avenue of litigation may circumvent the difficulties posed in alternative 
mechanisms requiring voluntary participation such as arbitration and 
mediation.90  Without any incentive, such partaking on behalf of 
 
 79. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). The Court determined that 
the transnational context of the dispute implicated risks to international comity. Id. 
 80. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States.”). 
 83. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (allowing victims of serious human rights abuses 
abroad to sue under federal common law in federal court). 
 84. See id. at 887-88. 
 85. Id. at 885. 
 86. Roger Alford, The Diplomatic Friction of ATS Litigation, OPINIOJURIS (May 29, 
2009), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/05/29/the-diplomatic-friction-of-ats-litigation/. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See Christopher A. Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance, 2 ST. JOHN’S J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 55, 56-60 (2012) [hereinafter Whytock, Transnational]; see also 
Globalisation and Human Rights, supra note 33. 
 89. See, e.g., Romero v. Drumond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (exercising 
jurisdiction over Colombian subsidiary defendant under the Alien Tort Statute). 
 90. See Jack J. Coe et al., Arbitration and Mediation in Cross Border Disputes: 
Possibilities and Limitations, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 231, 237-49 (2019) (discussing the 
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corporate defendants is not likely to be acquired.91  Alternatively, the 
favorable biases of domestic courts towards host state actors are likely 
to impact foreign parties from procuring a favorable judgment.92  Despite 
this risk, parties may prefer the public nature of the litigation process, 
allowing them to call attention to corporate abuses and access to obtain 
reparations through legally binding judgments.  Similarly, an 
international court could intend this judicial impact, while serving as a 
more neutral forum for foreign litigants.  Despite this, international 
mechanisms are lacking in communitarian, transnational support,93 
leaving national options more accessible to private parties. 
A. Domestic Litigation: International Human Rights Claims Against 
Corporations in U.S. Courts 
A recognized leader of largescale judicial governance, U.S. courts 
have been known to be “among the most influential” in handling 
transnational disputes.94  However, in the effort to maintain diplomacy 
and respect of territoriality, U.S. federal courts became reluctant to 
entertain claims involving foreign parties.  Accordingly, several recent 
and notable Supreme Court rulings have largely restricted federal 
jurisdiction over international human rights claims in the U.S.95 
In the 2013 Supreme Court case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.,96 the federal court system constricted the reach of the ATS and its 
ability to hear cases of international human rights against corporate 
actors.97  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiobel after the 
Second Circuit held that corporations are not subject to suit under the 
ATS because “corporate liability ha[d] not been established specifically 
 
voluntary nature of alternate dispute mechanisms, including the voluntary nature of consent-
based arbitration and voluntary convening for mediation). 
 91. There are apparent difficulties in relying on voluntary methods when corporations 
are unlikely to consent to being sued nor voluntarily appear to defend themselves against 
claims of human rights abuses. Thus, instigating corporate incentives to maintain business 
relations or consumer interests may be considered among the possible incentives for ADR. 
 92. See generally Ronán Feehily, Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality in 
International Commercial Arbitration, A Fine Balance in the Quest for Arbitral Justice, 7 
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 88 (2019). 
 93. See generally Kamil Omoteso & Hakeem Yusuf, Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations in the Developing World, 13 EMERALD PUBLISHING LIMITED 54 (May 26, 
2016). 
 94. Whytock, Transnational, supra note 88, at 64. 
 95. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). Jesner and Kiobel cases placed strict judicial limitations 
on Alien Tort Statute litigation against corporate defendants. 
 96. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 97. See id. at 124-25. 
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as part of international law.”98  The Supreme Court ultimately held that 
the case was barred under the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
leaving unresolved the question of whether the ATS applied to suits 
against foreign corporations.99  Similarly, the 2018 Supreme Court 
decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank,100 established that “absent further action 
from Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS 
liability to foreign corporations.”101  This decision further restricted 
federal jurisdiction and limited the legal recourse available to victims of 
corporate human rights abuses. 
These cases reveal the evolution of human rights claims in the U.S. 
following Filartiga and the challenges of establishing personal 
jurisdiction over corporations for human rights violations.  The holdings, 
made in an effort to curtail foreign policy implications, have left human 
rights victims with limited options to obtain legal recourse under the 
ATS.102  Similarly, petitioners have narrow alternatives to litigate in 
federal court since few express private causes of action exist for 
international human rights.103  Nevertheless, petitioners whose human 
rights claims cannot be litigated in federal courts may still bring their 
claims in state courts by establishing personal jurisdiction over a 
corporate defendant.104  A court obtains official power to make such 
legal decisions and judgments by a showing of either general or specific 
jurisdiction over the defendant.105  Accordingly, the following sections 
will outline both courses of jurisdiction. 
 
 98. Christopher A. Whytock, Donald E. Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: 
After Kiobel – International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 
3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2013) [hereinafter Whytock, After Kiobel] (following the 
Second Circuit opinion, in which the majority held that corporations were not subject to 
international law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this question under 
customary international law). 
 99. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125 (noting that nothing in the opinion limited Congress from 
amending the ATS in order to bring corporate defendants within the courts’ jurisdiction). 
 100. Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 101. See id. at 1403. 
 102. Id. at 1408 (“[A]ny imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for 
violations of international law must be determined in the first instance by the political 
branches of the Government.”). 
 103. Whytock, After Kiobel, supra note 98, at 4 (noting the Torture Victim Protection Act 
and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as express causes of action for international human 
rights under U.S. federal law). 
 104. See id. at 6; see also VAGTS ET AL., supra note 7, at 141 (“Another method of holding 
corporations accountable for the social . . . impacts of their activity is ordinary civil litigation 
in domestic courts . . . The claims may allege violation of domestic tort or statutory law, or of 
international law.”); id. at 142 (“There are many barriers to such claims, including limitations 
on personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.”). 
 105. See Craig Sanders, Of Carrots and Sticks: General Jurisdiction and Genuine 
Consent, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2017) (“A state’s jurisdictional power over 
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1. General Jurisdiction in U.S. State Courts 
A human rights victim may bring a claim in state court for conduct 
occurring overseas by invoking general jurisdiction over a domestic 
corporation.  In Goodyear,106 the Supreme Court held that a corporation 
is subject to the general jurisdiction of a state in which its contacts are 
so “continuous and systematic” as to render a corporation “essentially at 
home.”107  Following this outcome, the court in Daimler108 relied on 
Goodyear to clarify that a corporation’s state of incorporation or 
principal place of business renders it “at home” in the respective state 
and therefore subject to its jurisdiction.109  In contrast, the BNSF110 Court 
held that unrelated “in-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the 
assertion of general jurisdiction” over a defendant corporation.111  Thus, 
a human rights victim may bring a claim against a domestic corporation 
for conduct occurring overseas in state court of the state only where the 
corporation is considered “at home.”112 
2. Specific Jurisdiction in U.S. State Courts 
Another avenue for achieving personal jurisdiction over a 
corporation is through specific jurisdiction.  Specific jurisdiction is 
derived from a showing of “related contacts [that] took place in the 
forum [state],” thus establishing “an affiliation between the forum and 
the underlying controversy.”113  In McIntyre,114 the Court held that 
asserting jurisdiction is lawful when the defendant “purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”115  Six years later, in 
Bristol-Myers,116 the Court held that a “corporation’s ‘continuous 
activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not enough to support the 
demand that the corporation be amendable to suits unrelated to that 
 
defendants is couched in either specific ‘conduct- linked’ jurisdiction or general ‘all-purpose’ 
jurisdiction.”). 
 106. Goodyear v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 107. Id. at 919. 
 108. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 109. See id. at 137 (citing Goodyear, 563 U.S. at 924). 
 110. BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
 111. Id. at 1559. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017); Patrick 
J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court Human Rights Actions, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 45, 57 (2013). 
 114. McIntyre Machinery, LTD. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 115. Id. at 877. 
 116. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
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activity.’ ” 117  Therefore, under specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff may 
bring a claim against a foreign corporate defendant where there is a 
strong finding of “the defendant’s relationship to the forum State” and 
where “the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the 
power of a sovereign.”118 
Despite the barriers in the U.S. for litigating international human 
rights claims in federal courts, state courts may provide a viable means 
of remedy under private civil tort law.  Still, other procedural and 
substantive obstacles remain which may prevent victims from receiving 
recourse through this avenue.119  For this reason, among others, it is 
important to consider the use of neutral forums available to remedy and 
prevent continuing corporate abuses.  Accordingly, international dispute 
resolution mechanisms present great potential to serve as neutral judicial 
forums for this purpose.120 
B. International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
When domestic laws fail to remedy human rights violations, 
“injured parties may . . . resort to international mechanisms for 
remedy.”121  However, the current international system is not yet 
equipped to handle such cases involving corporate actors.122  While 
human rights have been codified in international law,123 an international 
court having jurisdiction over private party claims for corporate human 
rights abuses is yet to be established.  Without such means, the 
enforcement mechanisms available for the protection of human rights at 
the transnational level have proven inadequate.  The International Court 
of Justice and International Criminal Court are among the two most 
recognized international tribunals still in existence; however, both have 
restrictions that make them unavailable for this purpose. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established in 1945 to 
settle legal disputes and provide advisory opinions for UN member 
states.124  The ICJ, considered the principal judicial organ of the UN, 
 
 117. Id. at 1781. 
 118. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779; McIntyre Machinery, LTD., 131 S. Ct. at 873. 
 119. Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law 
and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 17-20 (2013). 
 120. See id. 
 121. International Human Rights Law, supra note 77. 
 122. See generally David Scheffer, Corporate Liability under the Rome Statute, 57 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 35 (2016). 
 123. See International Law and Justice, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/global-
issues/international-law-and-justice (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (outlining the development of 
a body of international law and judicial organs). 
 124. The Court, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/court (last visited Feb. 7, 
2021). 
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only hears contentious cases between member states or states who have 
otherwise accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. 125  Thus, private parties 
have no right of access to obtain recourse for human rights abuses under 
this mechanism. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to 
prosecute individuals for the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.126  In addition to the 
limited scope of claims for which the ICC has jurisdiction over, the 
parties must also be citizens of state parties to the Rome Statute who 
assent to the Court’s jurisdiction.127  Like the ICJ, the ICC remains 
unavailable for the purposes of human rights judicial resolution against 
corporate actors. 
It is unlikely that a global forum for this purpose will be established 
until there is further global participation in the enforcement of 
international law for human rights.  Without adequate international 
support, social enforcement on corporations to abide by the UNHR and 
respective human rights treaties may persist as the only multinational 
scrutiny accessible to individuals—a social adjudication per se.  As long 
as corporations remain focused on generating profit for their 
shareholders, they will remain responsive to the interests of their 
consumer base and motivated to preserve their image and reputation in 
competitive markets.  In this way, the people’s collective voice may 
serve best to demand change in the face of corporate neglect, especially 
where the host state is not proactively protecting its citizens or corporate 
settlements act to quiet any commotion.128  Meanwhile, the transition to 
 
 125. See John R. Crook, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 NW. J.  
HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2004); see also How the Court Works, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-
cij.org/en/how-the-court-works (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (explaining that the International 
Court of Justice is competent to hear legal disputes between States who are members of the 
United Nations). 
 126. International Law and Justice, supra note 123 (explaining that jurisdiction for crimes 
of aggression is contingent upon an agreement as to the definition of such a crime). 
 127. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-
court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legalProcess (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (explaining that the 
ICC has jurisdiction over four main crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and crimes of aggression). 
 128. See, e.g., Apoorva Mandavilli, The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster Is Still 
Unfolding, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/the-worlds-worst-industrial-disaster-
is-still-unfolding/560726/ (reporting that after a massive industrial gas leak in Bhopal, India, 
American company, Union Carbide Corporation, continues to deny liability, leaving the 
Indian Government to answer to the demands of human rights activists in the region); see also 
Larisa Epatko, 5 years after the world’s largest garment factory collapse, is safety in 
Bangladesh any better?, PBS (Apr. 6, 2018, 3:30 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/5-years-after-the-worlds-largest-garment-factory-
collapse-is-safety-in-bangladesh-any-better (reporting that in response to the globally 
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considering more serious reliance on alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms is essential until states submit to international adjudication 
for human rights. 
IV. THE AVENUES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW ADR 
MECHANISMS CAN BE USED TO HOLD TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Without an established international venue to litigate claims against 
transnational entities,129 and in the absence of binding international 
business standards,130 petitioners and activists are left to consider 
alternative avenues to obtain legal recourse and reparations for human 
rights violations.  Considering that ADR mechanisms require voluntary 
participation, petitioners must face the initial hurdle of navigating 
corporate cooperation.  This poses further difficulties when parent 
corporations do not claim liability for the acts of their subsidiaries.  In 
this way, corporate accountability requires transparency regarding the 
ownership and control of entities abroad.131  Such transparency is often 
lacking in conflict environments, where parent companies may be less 
accessible and are only responsible for answering on behalf of their 
subsidiaries when a petitioner successfully pierces the corporate veil.132 
After establishing liability, a corporation is still unlikely to avail 
itself to ADR without incentive.  The human rights regime may be most 
successful in incentivizing such cooperation by targeting the reputation 
of corporate entities and harnessing the support of the transnational 
consumer base.  Technological connectivity allows for immediate 
communications and broadcasts aimed at protecting the dignity of 
human rights against corporate abuses.  In response, corporate actors are 
likely to abide by resolution efforts to appeal to their consumer base and 
retain shareholder profits. 
Efforts to improve the administration of corporate social 
responsibility continue to be of the utmost importance in the fight for 
international human rights.  Until there is a direct means of subjecting 
 
recognized catastrophe of the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, corporate entities looking 
to salvage their reputation formed alliances to ensure the safety of the factories that supplied 
them). 
 129. See International Law and Justice, supra note 123. 
 130. See Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty, supra note 67. 
 131. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 7, at 129. 
 132. Péter D. Szigeti, Territorial Bias in International Law: Attribution in State and 
Corporate Responsibility, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 311, 350 (2010) (“The required test 
for a successful piercing of the corporate veil is that the subsidiary be a mere ‘instrumentality’ 
or an ‘alter ego’ of the mother corporation, where the subsidiary’s every action is decided in 
fact by the owner.”). 
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corporations to legal enforcement and repercussions, an increased 
understanding for ADR alternatives in the international context is 
crucial.  As a strong alternative to litigation in resolving disputes,133 
ADR mechanisms have long been relied upon by corporate entities in 
countries like the United States.134  To this effect, the American Bar 
Association formed the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution in 1993, to 
promote widespread educational efforts in ADR.135 
These alternative resolution processes have proven to be flexible, 
are voluntary, and provide parties with greater control over both the 
resolution method and outcome.136  Ultimately aiming to a “achieve 
peaceful resolution of disputes,”137 such mechanisms may appeal to the 
needs of human rights claimants who otherwise face challenges 
accessing recourse through litigation.  Accordingly, developments in 
ADR practice areas may further improve the cooperation and 
receptiveness of transnational corporations who wish to avoid the costs 
and publicity involved in litigation.  Thus, it is in the global community’s 
interests to explore these alternatives in the effort to close the loopholes 
of corporate social responsibility as pertaining to the international 
human rights regime.  The following sections will discuss the benefits 
that ADR alternatives present while focusing on arbitration and 
mediation as reliable means for upholding the protections of the UN 
Guiding Principles. 
A. Arbitration 
Arbitration is a neutral and private process in which disputing 
parties “agree that one or several [arbitrators] can make a decision about 
the dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments.”138  Arbitral 
proceedings have gained attention and momentum as an efficient and 
 
 133. See Tala Esmaili & Krystyna Gilkis, Alternative Dispute Resolution, CORNELL L. 
SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last updated June 
2017). 
 134. See Darryl Geddes, U.S. corporations now widely use Alternative Dispute Resolution 
over litigation to solve disputes, national survey shows, CORNELL CHRON. (May 21, 1997), 
https://news.cornell.edu/stories/1997/05/survey-also-finds-lack-confidence-qualifications-
arbitrators; see also Michael McManus & Brianna Silverstein, Brief History of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in the United States, 1 CADMUS J. 100 (2011). 
 135. Anna Spain, Using International Dispute Resolution to Address the Compliance 
Question in International Law, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 807, 821 (2009) (stating that ABA efforts 
include, but are not limited to, hosting conferences and endorsing publications in areas of 
arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and conciliation). 
 136. Esmaili & Gilkis, supra note 133. 
 137. Spain, supra note 135, at 810. 
 138. Dispute Resolution Processes: Arbitration, A.B.A., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProces
ses/arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
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effective form of international dispute resolution.  Largely motivated by 
the globalization trends of the twentieth century, arbitration emerged as 
a substitute for litigation in the effort to depoliticize the settlement of 
disputes between multi-national parties.139  A mechanism providing 
parties with control to establish the terms of resolving any potential 
disputes, arbitration has become acknowledged for producing fair and 
just outcomes in international commercial arbitration.140  The impartial 
nature of arbitral proceedings presents an appealing alternative to 
litigation, allowing parties to evade the local biases of a host country’s 
foreign courts and laws.141  Arbitration is regarded as a less formal 
process, “rarely impos[ing] specific qualifications in order to act as an 
arbitrator.”142  Accordingly, it is not required that arbitrators be lawyers; 
instead, arbitrators may be neutral experts in the relevant field of dispute, 
such as scholars and professors or former judges.143  In addition, parties 
to arbitration maintain a high degree of control over the organization and 
outcome of the legal proceedings;144 they must agree on an appropriate 
venue and select one or more unbiased arbitrators to hear both sides of 
the case before issuing a final, binding decision.145  Petitioners may also 
prefer the flexibility of arbitral proceedings and the potential to obtain 
fast and affordable relief.146  Inversely, corporations may prefer the less 
formal and more efficient process of arbitration, including the level of 
confidentiality, and cooperation aiding the preservation of on-going 
business relationships.147 
The discretion and control which parties maintain under arbitration 
eliminate many of the risks perceived of litigation while maintaining a 
structured process and ensuring a binding award.  An arbitral decision 
usually cannot be appealed, contributing to faster procurement of 
potential remedy.148  The 1958 New York Convention,149 ratified by a 
 
 139. Michael Faure & Wanli Ma, Investor-State Arbitration: Economic and Empirical 
Perspectives, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 n.1 (2020). 
 140. Feehily, supra note 92, at 89. 
 141. See id. at 91. 
 142. Id. at 108. 
 143. See Esmaili & Gilkis, supra note 133. 
 144. See Aceris Law LLC, What is International Arbitration?, INT’L ARB., 
https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/what-is-international-arbitration/ (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
 145. See id. While having one arbitrator is less costly, parties may feel more comfortable 
with each having at least one member of the tribunal that they know will be sympathetic. 
 146. Dispute Resolution Processes: Arbitration, supra note 138. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. (“When arbitration is binding, the decision is final, can be enforced by a court, 
and can only be appealed on very narrow grounds.”). 
 149. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Oct. 
6, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 
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majority of countries,150 applies to provide a secured legal system and 
enforce foreign arbitral awards for cross-border disputes.151  These 
awards are considered final and are recognized and enforced by all 
ratifying member states and tribunals.152  Arbitral tribunals are neutral 
forums known for providing foreign parties a fair and efficient 
procedural framework, free of local biases.153  The following sections 
will discuss the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of 
Arbitration and The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights 
Arbitration, as two exemplary mechanisms of the interest to pursue 
arbitral justice. 
1. ICC International Court of Arbitration 
The ICC International Court of Arbitration154 is considered one of 
“the world’s leading institution[s] for providing international arbitration 
services.”155  The ICC framework outlines the arbitral procedures to be 
followed by parties to cross-border disputes,156 providing guidance 
towards resolution and an essential structure for enforcing accountability 
for corporate human rights obligations.  The ICC arbitration rules 
provide entities and private parties with flexible and efficient services to 
resolve disputes and enforce their outcomes.157  A 2018 statistical report 
revealed that the ICC has managed over 23,300 cases since its creation 
in 1923.158   
Although the ICC is considered a ‘court,’ it does not make formal 
judgements and instead exercises judicial supervision of arbitration 




 150. Feehily, supra note 92, at 89 (reporting that over 150 states had subscribed to the 
New York Convention by 2019). 
 151. See generally N.Y. Convention, supra note 149. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Susan L. Karamanian, The Role of International Human Rights Law in Re-Shaping 
Investor-State Arbitration, 45 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO 34, 34 (2017) [hereinafter Karamanian I]. 
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awards are considered binding, final, and enforceable in courts 
throughout the world.160  Generally, ICC arbitration ensures fewer 
obstacles for international enforcement than decisions derived from 
national courts; this is primarily because it is not unusual for national 
courts to refuse recognition or enforcement of a judgment derived from 
another sovereign state.161  Thus, arbitral awards prove more readily 
accessible and contractual. 
Arbitration is mostly a confidential process, meaning the general 
public cannot attend the proceedings or view its record.162  Despite this, 
the court may establish allowances for persons to attend the proceedings 
or have access to materials of a case based on necessity.163  While some 
records are accessible through the ICC’s website, these publications 
usually omit items of party identification, trade secrets, and any other 
sensitive information.164  In turn, arbitration is a great alternative for a 
business entity wishing to maintain a reasonable degree of privacy over 
a case and to avoid any exposure that could otherwise be injurious to 
their reputation.  Recent developments in ICC arbitration have allowed 
for the limited publication of arbitration awards.165 
In January 2019, the ICC published a notice indicating the 
implementation of new policies to promote transparency and increase 
efficiency in international arbitration.166  This transition is supported on 
grounds to make the decision-making process accessible, to improve the 
arbitral process generally, and to promote global trade.167  Still, award 
publications are subject to party consent, therefore, parties may object to 
any publication or may opt to have awards “anonymised or 
pseudonymised.”168  This feature may be encouraging to corporate 
defendants who may prefer arbitration for its confidentiality aspect.  
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Alternatively, human rights claimants will likely favor greater 
transparency in holding corporations accountable for international law 
violations.  Although awards are non-binding on preceding cases, such 
publications may provide integral information for cases having similar 
facts.169  Thus, the transition is likely to promote efficiency in the 
determination and consistency of outcomes while maintaining its appeal 
to private parties and business entities. 
2. The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration 
The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration were 
established to “provide a set of rules for the arbitration of business and 
human rights disputes.”170  In 2019, working sessions were held by the 
Business and Human Rights Arbitration Working Group, a 
representative group of over two hundred individuals, which recognized 
arbitration as a mechanism having “great promise . . . to resolve human 
rights disputes involving business.”171  Accordingly, the Drafting Team 
set out to develop standards inspired by the Arbitration Rules of the 
United Nations Commission International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).172   
The Drafting Team acknowledged that disputes of international 
human rights related to transnational corporations were being held in 
national courts, which were subject to corruption and political influence, 
or were generally unqualified to handle such disputes.173  In contrast, 
arbitration offers “unique attributes that could serve . . . parties well even 
where fair and competent courts are available.”174  After devoting five 
years consulting with stakeholders and drafting text, the Drafting Team 
officially launched the Hague Rules on December 12, 2019.175  The 
intent behind this project was to close the remedy gap of the UNGPs by 
establishing an “international private judicial dispute resolution avenue 
available to parties involved in business and human rights issues.”176  In 
this way, the Hague Rules are directly challenging the legal obstacles 
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faced by victims of business-related abuses while also working towards 
ascertaining transparency in proceedings and awards.177 
Skepticism emerged from both business groups and civil society 
towards a private adjudicative remedy for the resolution of human rights 
claims and the challenge to arrive at rules that would appeal to multiple 
stakeholders.178  However, the party discretion endorsed in arbitral 
proceedings can be used by transnational corporations “to prevent abuse 
from occurring in their supply chains and development projects.”179  
This, in turn, may prevent future cases from arising and contributes to 
the overarching goal of minimizing international law violations.180 
The Hague Rules outline mechanisms that are consistent with the 
UNGP pillars, addressing adverse human rights impacts under the 
respect pillar and grievances consistent with the remedy pillar.181  The 
Hague Rules principally follow the UNCITRAL rules, “with 
modifications needed to address certain issues likely to arise in the 
context of business and human rights disputes.”182  Arbitral institutions, 
including the ICC, may serve as “an administrating or an appointing 
authority under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.”183  With similarities 
to the ICC rules of arbitration, the UNCITRAL rules provide a neutral 
forum, maintain party confidentiality, and issue awards which “may be 
made public in limited circumstances.”184  Additionally, in the 
promotion of increased accessibility, the Rules are not limited by the 
type of claimants, respondents, or subject-matter of the dispute.185  
Despite the newfound potential for arbitral success in this area, the Rules 
encourage the settlement of disputes by collaborative settlement 
mechanisms such as mediation.186 
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3. Investor State Arbitration 
Investor-State Arbitration (ISA), also known as Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), was initiated as an “unbiased arbitration 
mechanism to resolve conflicts between states and foreign investors.”187  
ISA has become an increasingly relied upon practice of dispute 
resolution, proving protections that are imperative to entities seeking to 
do business in foreign territory. 188  Under this mechanism, private 
investors enter into either bilateral or multilateral agreements with 
sovereign states to conduct business in their territory under agreed upon 
terms, including governing dispute arrangements.189  Through 
international investor agreements (IIAs) parties are considered as having 
provided advance consent to arbitrate.190  The execution of IIAs 
constitutes a promise on behalf of the State to “treat foreign investment 
and investors in a certain, fundamentally fair, way.”191  This includes the 
right not to have investor property expropriated without compensation—
a major concern of foreign entities and a primary incentive to enter into 
such agreements.192 
The investor-state arbitration process, established largely to protect 
foreign investors’ interests against local power, provides a safeguard 
against States who breach international standards.193  States must 
therefore balance the protection of investor interests with their 
international obligations under international human instruments.  
Despite this, ISA is a “largely private system” which has been criticized 
as “incapable of addressing matters of public concern such as human 
rights.”194  Disputes arising out of IIAs are brought only on behalf of the 
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investor corporations and not by state governments.195  This places the 
state in a defensive position and limits its ability to hold corporations 
accountable for human rights abuses without inciting an action against 
themselves.  However, this approach may serve as a viable strategy for 
states to uphold the human rights of their citizens to shed light on, and 
ultimately uphold, such international standards. 
In this way, a state would have to break the terms of their IIA to 
retaliate for corporate abuses taking place in their territory.  A corporate 
investor may then bring a claim to be adjudicated under ISA against the 
government under the terms of their bilateral agreement.  In response, 
the state may use the international law human rights standards to defend 
its actions and uphold the fundamental rights of its people.  Although 
viable, this may not be effective considering how many underdeveloped 
state governments “curtail human rights for the sake of economic 
development.”196 
There are other general concerns on behalf of state parties, which 
perceive ISA as favorably biased towards investors.197  In addition, the 
human rights regime raises concerns over the lack of public access to the 
arbitral process, given that such cases constitute matters of public 
concern.198  Criticism in this regard has considered this privatized effect 
as “render[ing] the arbitration process incompatible with human 
rights.”199  To combat this, recent agreements are recognized for 
“includ[ing] specific provisions requiring arbitral proceedings to be open 
to the public.”200  Accordingly, the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has begun to provide limited access to 
published decisions.201  While not usually parties, citizens can be 
beneficiaries of an arbitral award, allowing for the possibility for victims 
to be heard in the proceedings. 
Another challenge facing investor-state arbitration is the lower 
predictability of outcomes given that “each arbitral tribunal may decide 
a case . . . without regard to previous awards.”202  Both international 
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human rights law and investment law are grounded in public 
international law, derived from treaties and customary law.203  Ensuring 
that arbitrators are well versed in international human rights law is one 
method in which to close the gaps of this nature.  Using investor-state 
arbitration, private parties may direct their enforcement efforts to their 
own governments to develop greater access to a viable platform to bring 
their human rights claims against corporate entities. 
B. Mediation 
Another ADR mechanism, mediation, is a third-party negotiation 
process held in a neutral forum where parties may “discuss and try to 
resolve [their] dispute” prior to deferring to more formal processes.204  
Through mediation, a settlement may be facilitated through negotiations 
that take place with parties either together or separately.205  While a 
mediator may conduct information gathering and suggest solutions, a 
mediator “does not have the power to make a decision for the parties,” 
as only the parties themselves may agree to a resolution.206  The 
mediator, chosen by the parties, maintains a neutral role and does not 
have a stake in the outcome of the dispute.207  Typically, a mediator is a 
trained professional with relevant qualifications who helps parties find 
common ground and assists in drafting a resolution which the parties 
agree to; they do not have decision-making authority.208  The degree of 
control which parties maintain in mediation contributes to the appeal of 
this mechanism, providing parties with the confidence to secure a 
resolution with which they are most comfortable. 
Business leaders have been known to prefer mediation to resolve 
commercial transaction disagreements in order to preserve relationships, 
as well as to save time and money.209  The process provides parties an 
opportunity to resolve their case by “understanding and evaluat[ing] . . . 
each [party’s] position based on what that [party] has to say.”210  In this 
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way, mediation can be considered a more personable dispute resolution 
process, in which it is perceived as “possible to have a ‘win-win 
outcome.’ ” 211 
With similarities to other ADR methods, mediation is especially 
recognized for facilitating open communication and understanding 
between parties.212  The process is voluntary, and the outcome is 
nonbinding213—the biggest distinction from arbitration.  Because the 
outcome does not bind parties, they may ignore the result altogether or 
seek a more favorable and binding outcome through an alternative 
mechanism such as arbitration or litigation.  While the confidence in 
enforcement of mediation outcomes is not strong, it may pose a 
favorable means to meet both parties’ needs, especially where a quick 
resolve may allow for continued operations. 
V. WHY ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MAY 
BEST SERVE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMANTS 
International human rights claims brought against corporate 
defendants are generally comprised of complex issues involving various 
applicable laws, language barriers, and cultural differences.  Litigation 
has traditionally been relied on as the primary judicial means of human 
rights dispute resolution, thought to ensure a consistent procedural and 
legal structure with outcomes governed by established rules.214  
Additionally, parties who do not agree with a court’s decision may 
appeal to a higher court, ensuring the prerogative of justice.215  However, 
in considering all international coordination challenges, litigation may 
ultimately prove unfavorable to both petitioning and defending parties 
to a corporate human rights cause of action. 
In comparison to alternative dispute mechanisms, litigation is 
generally a longer process, requiring more financing and resources to be 
carried out.216  Accordingly, a human rights petitioner will likely be 
disadvantaged in bringing a claim against a corporate defendant that may 
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be more able to afford the associated time and costs of litigation.217  
Additionally, trial proceedings are public; while a human rights claimant 
may prefer this level of exposure, the publicity of court cases may 
negatively affect the market dynamics of business entities.  Thus, a 
corporate defendant wishing to evade public access to sensitive 
information or reputational harm may instead settle to avoid defending 
the case on the merits.  This potential outcome of litigation may prevent 
a petitioner from having their day in court and being able to share their 
story.  Moreover, there are various procedural and substantive obstacles 
involved in requiring a corporate defendant to appear in court,218 as well 
as the potential difficulties faced in having judgment upheld which may 
have been rendered in another state or under foreign laws. 
Apart from domestic courts, there are few international tribunals 
that hear human rights claims.219  From these, problems exist for 
acquiring jurisdiction over claims against corporate defendants.  The UN 
Security Council established both the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 220  These tribunals provided an 
international forum for humanitarian law, bringing justice to victims of 
international crimes.221  These courts demonstrated how the procurement 
of international justice was essential, leading to the creation of the 
world’s first permanent International Criminal Court in 2002.222  The 
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ICC, like the preceding ad hoc tribunals, only hears cases brought against 
‘natural persons’ and therefore is not an available venue for transnational 
business disputes.223  Generally, corporate criminal liability has not been 
recognized under international law, although many states have made 
efforts to extend their national jurisdiction to include corporate 
defendants. 224  Despite the changes in the international climate, 
motivating efforts to recognize corporate liability, the absence of a 
legally binding international treaty or further legal authorizations has left 
corporate litigation to occur mostly domestically.225 
The challenges involved in multi-national corporate litigation have 
encouraged the transitioning of legal efforts toward alternative dispute 
resolution.  ADR mechanisms are ways of settling disputes with the help 
of a neutral third party.  When used effectively, ADR may lower costs, 
produce quicker resolutions, and preserve or improve relationships 
among parties.226  The common forms of ADR include arbitration, 
conciliation, negotiation, mediation, and collaborative law.227  By 
utilizing ADR mechanisms, combined with the current status of 
international human rights law, disputes against transnational 
corporations may be resolved more effectively and efficiently. 
Using this ADR mechanism, both petitioners and defendants 
maintain a high degree of self-sufficiency, allowing parties to feel ‘in 
control’ of their situation, process, and outcome.  Finding a way to 
complement this principle with stronger enforcement of international 
human rights law is essential to the elimination of corporate abuses. 
VI. STANDARDIZING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CASES 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Given the challenges facing human rights enforcement under 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, it is advisable that states from 
the Global South consider feasible means by which to protect their 
citizens and uphold basic human rights norms.  A region known for 
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having a weaker rule of law, corporations from the Global North are able 
to exploit resources and labor for their financial benefit with little to no 
consideration of their social responsibly.228  Naming and shaming 
methods are not good enough as corporations have been known to make 
short-term adjustments only until their name is out of the media 
spotlight.229 
Despite existing cross-border coordination challenges, there are 
alternative avenues that governments in the Global South could utilize 
to vindicate human rights claims against corporations, including 
domestic litigation, investor-state arbitration, and mediation.  Using 
these mechanisms, developing countries may increase their bargaining 
power by contracting with corporate investors and requiring a committal 
to ADR.230 
Enforcement of international law presents various challenges, 
particularly when handling cases involving actors belonging to states 
that have not implemented international treaties.  While ongoing efforts 
are yet to solve these problems, the international human rights regime 
cannot afford to be patient.  History pertaining to this area has shown 
that UN member states are committed to preventing fundamental human 
rights violations.231  However, this commitment has been challenged by 
corporate activity which has introduced new obstacles associated with 
the enforcement of these rights.232  Litigation of claims can be costly and 
time-consuming.233  Accordingly, it is important to develop a better 
understanding of ADR mechanisms to target ways in which to best 
address corporate accountability for international human rights. 
Although the UNGPs inspired business entities to incorporate 
socially responsible frameworks into their business models, there is no 
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legally binding obligation under international law to uphold them.234  
Any corrective action taken in this context can be largely attributed to 
motivations of receiving favorable media coverage, appeasing social 
movements, and catering to market forces and domestic laws.235  
Instances of continued human rights abuses reveal the necessity for 
holding corporations accountable for their violations. 
By using the aspects of more than one ADR mechanism, the 
international community may begin to reveal the avenues most effective 
to obtain recourse for victims.  One possibility would be to establish a 
collective process involving mediation and arbitration to find a middle 
ground solution.  This would begin with a form of mediation to foster a 
private and collaborative environment for negotiation,236 and would 
provide the opportunity to reach a settlement agreement before moving 
forward to a process of arbitration.  Having an arbitral hearing consistent 
with the procedures set forth in ‘The Hague Rules on Business and 
Human Rights Arbitration’ will provide the necessary structure to the 
enforcement of human rights.237 
Socialization of human rights may prove effective to pressure 
corporate entities into proactive compliance with the codified 
international standards.  When the masses develop a voice in support of 
good behavioral patterns, transnational entities will respond to remain 
competitive and profitable.  Such a combination of process would 
encourage transnational corporations to settle claims to avoid moving 
forward with a lengthy resolution process in which they must surrender 
more of their control.238  Additionally, the incentive to settle may cater 
to victims having more equal bargaining power than they would 
otherwise.  A human rights victim may be motivated to proceed to 
arbitration for having a binding arbitral award be published, and 
exposing the wrongdoer in a more officiated manner.  Thus, by wanting 
to avoid arbitration, a corporate defendant may be more willing to reach 
a resolve which favors the interests of the victim.  Maneuvering among 
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ADR alternatives, petitioners may find a pattern of success in this area 
of enforcement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The complexities of transnational corporate entities pose significant 
challenges to regulatory mechanisms.239  Due to the obstacles involved 
in enforcement by traditional legal dispute resolution, ADR alternatives 
such as arbitration and mediation may prove a more reliable means of 
upholding the protections of the UNGPs.  With the expansion of 
globalization, putting pressure on the corporate sector, there is an 
increased necessity for effective dispute resolution among the intricate 
relationships of transnational corporations, investors, and states.  ADR 
may provide remedy for international human rights violations in places 
where judicial proceedings are not available or effective.  These 
mechanisms have developed to allow parties from different legal, 
linguistic, and cultural backgrounds to resolve their disputes in neutral 
and fair settings. 
While economic incentives in the global market continue to counter 
corporate efforts to prioritize human rights,240 human rights victims 
depend on the efforts of the international legal community to ensure that 
these impacts are corrected.  Although instruments such as the Draft 
Treaty on Business and Human Rights and the Hague Rules on Business 
and Human Rights Arbitration have only recently been made available 
for reference, they provide great potential in the efforts to give “teeth” 
to the UNGPs.241  Arbitral proceedings provide parties with the 
flexibility to select procedures most appropriate for resolving 
international human rights claims, while mediation provides a 
collaborative operation to bring adverse parties together to remedy 
human rights abuses committed by transnational corporations.  
Additionally, transnational business entities may hold their subsidiary 
partners accountable to meet their business responsibilities under the 
UNGPs.242 
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Thus, under current circumstances, the human rights regime may 
rely on ADR alternatives as a modern approach to best overcome the 
challenges involved in transnational corporate adjudication.  This 
avenue, providing neutral grounds for parties from different legal 
systems and of mixed nationalities, may resolve claims against 
transnational entities without fear of subjectivity by forum state courts 
in the effort to preserve humanitarian interests and promote healthy 
corporate relations. 
